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The fashion industry has short product life cycles, tremendous product variety, volatile and unpredictable demand, and
long and inﬂexible supply processes. These characteristics, a complex supply chain and wide availability of data make the
industry a suitable avenue for efﬁcient supply chain management practices. The industry has also been in a transition over
the last 20 years: signiﬁcant consolidation in retail, majority of apparel manufacturing operations moving overseas and,
more recently, increasing use of electronic commerce in retail and wholesale trade. This paper aims to review the current
state of operations and recent trends across the fashion supply chain in the US. We use industry-wide data, articles from
business journals, industry reviews and extensive interviews with an apparel manufacturer in California, and a major US
department store chain to describe the current operational practices and how the industry is restructuring itself during the
transition, focusing at the apparel manufacture and retail segments of the supply chain.
r 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The fashion industry is characterized by short
product life cycles, volatile and unpredictable
demand, tremendous product variety, long and
inﬂexible supply processes, and a complex supply
chain. In such an environment, efﬁcient supply
chain management (SCM) practices can spell the
difference between success and failure. Despite this
potential and the vast availability of transactional
data, we see that the industry has been neglected in
terms of SCM research and practice. The main
objective of this paper is to review the operations
and identify major supply chain issues in the fashion
industry in order to provide a background forfront matter r 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
e.2007.05.022
2 290 1539; fax: +90 312 266 4054.
ss: alpersen@bilkent.edu.trresearchers, educators and practitioners. Our pri-
mary focus is the fashion industry in the US, for
which we will provide an overview in the remainder
of this section.
The textile and apparel supply chain in the US
consists of about 22,000 companies and employs
about 675,000 people (excluding retailing channels)
in four segments (US Census Bureau 2004a, NAICS
codes 313, 314 and 315). At the top of the supply
chain, there are ﬁber producers using either natural
or ‘‘man-made’’ (synthetic) materials. Raw ﬁber is
spun, woven or knitted into fabric by the second
segment: the textile mills. The third segment of the
supply chain consists of the apparel manufacturers
or the manufacturers of industrial textile products.
The ﬁnal segment consists of the retailers that offer
the apparel and other textile products for sale to
consumers. Below, we brieﬂy outline each segment..
ARTICLE IN PRESS
A. S- en / Int. J. Production Economics 114 (2008) 571–593572The discussion for this section builds heavily on the
US International Trade Commission (1999), Brown
and Rice (1998), Ostic (1997), Hammond and Kelly
(1991) and the National Academy of Engineering
(1983).
1.1. Fiber and yarn production
Fibers are usually classiﬁed into two groups:
natural and man-made. Natural ﬁbers include plant
ﬁbers such as cotton, linen, jute, cellulosic ﬁbers and
animal ﬁbers such as wool that are produced by
agricultural ﬁrms. Agricultural ﬁrms are scattered
all around the US and are usually small in size.
Synthetic ﬁbers include nylon, polyester and acrylic.
Synthetic ﬁber production usually requires signiﬁ-
cant capital and knowledge, and thus synthetic
ﬁber producers, such as DuPont and DAK, are
large and sophisticated. There are 77 such producers
in the US and the top eight producers share 76.9%
of the US synthetic ﬁber production (US Census
Bureau, 2002, NAICS code 32522). Natural
and synthetic ﬁbers of short lengths are converted
into yarn by spinners, throwsters and texturizers.
This conversion process is also capital intensive
and is considerably different for each type of
ﬁber. Blending different ﬁbers may need additional
sophistication.
1.2. Fabric production
This segment of the supply chain transforms the
yarn into fabric by weaving, knitting or a non-
woven process. In a weaving process, yarns are
interlaced lengthwise and widthwise at right angles.
Yarn may be woven by a simple procedure to
produce generic goods and then dyed for a speciﬁc
fabric. Alternatively, dyed yarns may be woven. In
knitting, yarn is interlooped by latched and spring
needles. The process may generate rolls of knitted
fabric or may specialize in a particular apparel such
as sweaters or hosiery. Non-woven processes
involve compression and interlocking ﬁbers by
mechanical, thermal, chemical or ﬂuid methods.
The fabric production segment consists of about
1335 companies of mainly two types (US Census
Bureau, 2004a, NAICS code 3132). Many small and
medium companies are engaged in the production
of a limited range of fabrics (there are 811
companies that employ less than 20 employees)
and a small number of huge ﬁrms such as
Burlington and Milliken produce a wide range offabrics (there are 92 companies that employ more
than 500 employees).
1.3. Apparel manufacture
Apparel manufacturing starts with the design
of the garment to be made. Pattern pieces are
created from the designs, which are then used to
cut the fabric. The cut fabric is assembled into
garments, labeled and shipped. The apparel
segment is the most labor-intensive and fragmented
segment of the supply chain. Capital and knowledge
requirements are not signiﬁcant, making it attrac-
tive for new entries. There are currently about
12,000 companies in this segment (US Census
Bureau, 2004a, NAICS code 315). The ﬁrms in
the women’s and girl’s categories tend to be
smaller, while ﬁrms in the less fashion-sensitive
men’s and boy’s clothing, knit-wear and under-
wear categories can utilize economies of scale and
tend to be larger in size. The average number
of employees in men’s apparel companies is about
71, compared with only 33 in women’s apparel
companies (US Census Bureau, 2004a). Apparel
companies usually specialize in narrower product
categories and rarely produce garments of both
genders.
Traditional apparel manufacturers and integrated
knitting mills for knit-wear are engaged in all phases
of apparel manufacturing: product design, material
sourcing, apparel manufacturing and marketing of
the ﬁnished goods. Jobbers perform all of these
activities except apparel manufacturing, which they
outsource to contractors in either the US or
overseas. Contractors are engaged in the manufac-
turing of garments and are not responsible for
sourcing raw material or the design and marketing
of these garments. The distinction between manu-
facturers and contractors may not be very clear as
manufacturers may contract out their work or
perform contract work for other manufacturers,
and contractors sometimes may start their own
private labels. Some US manufacturers cut fabrics
in the US and send cuts to a low wage country
to be assembled. The assembled garments are then
shipped back to the US for ﬁnishing. Manufacturers
pay tariff only on the value added outside the
US with this type of production, which is often
called 807 sourcing. A proﬁtable choice for such
production sharing is the Caribbean Basin region
countries because of their proximity to the US
market.
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Fashion products are sold in a variety of retail
channels. Specialty stores, such as The Limited and
Gap, offer a limited range of fashion products and
related accessories specializing in a particular
market segment. Specialty stores accounted for
28.5% of all retail sales in dollars in 2003 (EPM
Communications, 2004). Department stores, such as
Macy’s, Nordstrom and Bloomingdale’s, offer a
large number of national brands in both hard and
soft goods categories. The market share of these
stores in apparel amounts to 19%. Another 18% of
the apparel sales took place in discounters or mass
merchandisers such as Wal-Mart, Kmart and
Target. These retailers offer a variety of hard and
soft goods in addition to apparel using an ‘‘every-
day low prices’’ strategy. Apparel chains, such as
J.C. Penney and Sears, offer a wider range of
products and command a market share of 16%.
Off-price stores, such as Marshalls and T.J. Maxx,
buy excess stock of designer-label and branded
apparel from manufacturers and other retailers and
are able to offer considerably low prices but with
incomplete assortments. Other companies that are
engaged in apparel retailing are mail order compa-
nies, e-tailers and factory outlets.
This paper aims to review the current state of
operations and recent trends across the fashion
supply chain. The review uses a variety of literature
including academic and trade journals, government
statistics, industry reviews and case studies. In
addition, we have conducted extensive interviews
with the owner of a US apparel manufacturer, a
former fashion buyer for a large department store,
and an independent specialty retailer. Next, we
provide some background information for these
sources.
In apparel manufacturing, our contact is Paugal
Industries. Paugal Industries is an apparel manu-
facturer located in the Fashion District in down-
town Los Angeles. Mr. Pierre Levy, originally from
France, founded Paugal in 1983, after working as a
sales representative for a large apparel retail chain
where he accumulated intimate knowledge of the
design, manufacture and retailing of apparel.
Paugal is a women’s apparel manufacturer specia-
lizing in products in the ‘‘fashion’’ category. Like
many companies in the women’s category, Paugal is
a small company with 18 regular employees. Paugal
has two types of operations. In the ﬁrst category,
Paugal designs and develops women’s sweatersunder the name Ultraknits. Ultraknits has two
brands: Fiﬁ, targeting younger consumers, and
Loop, targeting consumers looking for distinctive
fashion. All production in this category is per-
formed by independent contractors. Currently,
Paugal contracts its production out to four factories
in China and Bangladesh. Major customers of
Paugal in this category are department stores and
specialty chain stores. The production volume for
sweaters is about 40,000 units per month. In the
second category, Paugal acts as an intermediary
between the local contractors and mail order
companies for women’s dresses under the brand
name Olive. Paugal is not responsible for the design
of these dresses and uses two contractors that are
located in the Los Angeles area for their manufac-
turing. The production volume for women’s dresses
is about 5000 units per month. We selected Paugal
for our research contact as it is a small manufactur-
ing company reﬂecting the current situation in the
women’s fashion business and it is working with
major retailers and contracts some of its business to
off-shore companies.
In fashion retailing, we talked to a former buyer
of a major retail chain: Ms. Jennings and a buyer/
owner of an independent boutique: Ms. Massou-
dian. Ms. Jennings worked for 6 years as an
assistant buyer, department manager, group sales
manager, cosmetics and fragrance manager, and
operations manager for a large department store,
which we will call LDS throughout the paper, and
for 2 years as store manager for Gap. Ms.
Massoudian owned an independent high-end wo-
men’s apparel store in Palos Verdes, California, and
was mostly involved with purchasing decisions. We
selected buyers for our research contact, since the
buyer is the person who directly makes the decisions
for what to buy, whom to buy from, how much to
buy, how much to price, when to mark-down and
how much to mark-down, whereas the store
manager of a store in a chain has responsibilities
in the daily maintenance of the store operations
(both personnel and merchandise), and the chain
executive is more concerned with ﬁnancial control
and administrative policy making.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the operations in the last two
segments of the supply chain: apparel manufacture
and retail. This section details the major operational
decisions faced by the apparel manufacturers and
retailers and shows how these decisions are cur-
rently taken in practice through a rich review of the
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recent trends in apparel manufacture and retail:
retail consolidation, vertical integration and emer-
gence of private labels; import penetration and
production sharing; Quick Response systems; and
supplier selection for apparel retailers and electronic
commerce. This section demonstrates by ﬁgures
how the industry is restructuring and its impact on
operations of apparel manufacturers and retailers.
Section 4 summarizes our ﬁndings along with some
suggestions for future academic research.
2. Apparel manufacture and retail operations
This section aims to give an overview of
important issues and decision making in the last
two segments of the textile and apparel supply
chain. We analyze the manufacturing and retailing
operations separately, although vertical integration
taking place in the recent years makes it difﬁcult
to distinguish the retailers from manufacturers
(see Section 3.1).
2.1. Manufacturing operations
Domestic apparel market can be divided into
three different categories (US Ofﬁce of Technology
Assessment, 1987): ‘‘Fashion’’ products, with a 10-week product
life—approximately 35% of the market. ‘‘Seasonal’’ products, with a 20-week product
life—approximately 45% of the market. ‘‘Basic’’ products, sold throughout the year—
approximately 20% of the market.
Men’s and children’s merchandise usually fall
into the basic category, while women’s merchandise
dominates seasonal and fashion categories, showing
the importance of fashion and resulting frequent
design changes in the women’s market. A similar
categorization is made in Abernathy et al. (1995).
Manufacturing companies usually specialize in
narrower product categories. The type of product
the company focuses on deﬁnes not only the
manufacturing cycle and the intensity of the design
in its operations but also the manufacturing strategy
as suggested by Fisher (1997). Companies manu-
facturing basic products can utilize larger batches
and tend to be larger in size. Cost reduction is a
priority for these companies. Companies manufac-
turing fashion products have to live with smallerbatches and tend to be smaller in size. Flexibility is
the key to success for such companies (Taplin,
1997).
Companies’ involvement in apparel manufactur-
ing varies. Traditional manufacturers are responsi-
ble for all phases of manufacturing. But most of the
industry is organized in the form of jobbers and
contractors, jobbers being responsible for the de-
sign, cutting and marketing, and contractors being
responsible for the sewing and assembly.
The operations of an apparel manufacturer are
aligned with the sales seasons of different apparel
items it produces. Fashion products usually have
4–5 seasons in a year, while for seasonal items with
more stable year-round demand, there can be only
two seasons. For example, Paugal delivers its
fashion products in ﬁve different seasons given
below:Season Delivery times to RetailersFall 1 July – August
Fall 2 September – October
Holiday October – Mid November
Spring Late January – March
Summer March – Mid AprilAt LDS, there are four seasons for women’s
clothing, but many categories also have special sales
seasons such as Christmas.
2.1.1. Design
Design is either completed in-house or commis-
sioned to smaller design companies. The ﬁrst step in
design is analyzing the consumer that the company
is targeting. The design process is inﬂuenced by the
works of other designers presented in collections in
cities like Paris, Milan and New York, or trade
shows of the earlier seasons. Some apparel compa-
nies also use fashion-consulting services, which go
out into the streets to ﬁnd out the emerging styles
(The Wall Street Journal, 2007b). More important is
the feedback gained from the sales of the similar
products that were developed earlier, which requires
a collaboration between the retailers and the
manufacturer. Usually, prototype garments are
made for internal decision making. These tasks
take a considerable amount of time. The design
process usually starts while the previous year’s
garments are still retailed. The design process at J.C.
Penney, the nation’s third largest department store,
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company’s goal is to take this down to 17 weeks, the
average for fast turnaround companies such as Zara
and H&M (The Wall Street Journal, 2007a). At
Paugal, the design efforts for Fall 1 (2006)
merchandise to be delivered to retailers at the end
of July 2006 should start as early as early October
2005. At this time, the designers working for Paugal
are able to observe any particular trends popular
with the consumer in the Fall 1 (2005) season.
Design takes place until January 2006 and sample
production begins at Paugal’s own facilities.
Responsiveness may be greatly enhanced by
reducing the time required for design development.
Computer-aided design (CAD) systems are recently
being used for such reduction efforts. Besides
reductions in the actual design time, CAD systems
also reduce the time for making the pattern and
enable electronic storage of the design, which makes
later modiﬁcations and transmissions easy (Black-
burn, 1991). Recently emerging product lifecycle
management (PLM) technologies are targeting to
improve communications throughout the supply
chain during the product development process. The
primary beneﬁt of these new technologies is to
shorten the concept-to-production cycle time, which
is taking on average 26 weeks for the apparel and
footwear industry according to a research study by
Deloitte and Touche (Daily News Record, 2005).
The same study estimates that the PLM systems
lead to 30% reductions in product development
time. Many apparel manufacturers including VF
Corp., Gap and Liz Claiborne are using such
software.
2.1.2. Production of samples and order collection
The next step after the design in the fashion
calendar is the production of samples. At Paugal,
the ﬁrst samples are produced and approved by mid
February for the Fall 1 season. The samples are
shown to the buyers from retailers by market
representatives at major trade shows (e.g., Las
Vegas Magic Show) or at the retailer sites. Some
major customers may be also invited for on-site
exhibitions. Paugal, like most small manufacturers,
accumulates all of their orders and then proceed
with the production. Order quantities from retailers
are usually economically feasible. However, even if
a particular retailer asks for a non-economic
quantity of a particular design, the tendency is to
accept the order, considering the long-term relation-
ships with the retailers. The fourth week of April isusually the time that Paugal checks to see whether
the cumulative orders in each style exceed minimum
production quantities. Rarely, Paugal has to cancel
the orders, if the cumulative demand in a particular
style is not enough to carry out a cost-efﬁcient
production. Trading off the cost of such cancella-
tions against the cost of failing to capture enough
market share, Paugal has to plan its initial
merchandise assortment (samples to be shown to
the retailers) very carefully. Note that the customer
(and thus the retailer) preferences are highly
unpredictable when Paugal decides its assortment
and starts to collect its customer orders. This is
probably the only stochastic problem faced by
Paugal in its operations.
As a result of capacity constraints in peak
periods and recent trend of retailers willing to order
much closer to and even during the selling season,
some other companies have to commit them-
selves to some or all of their production volume
prior to gathering all their actual orders. For
example, Sport Obermeyer’s initial production
order before any order collection is as much as
half of its annual production (Hammond and
Raman, 1996).
2.1.3. Production
A strategic question for the apparel producers at
this point is where to carry out the manufacturing
operations. Some companies operate their own
facilities for manufacturing. Some others use con-
tractors. The trade-offs for this decision are typical
of any manufacturing operation. Some of them are
more control over quality and time, fewer commu-
nication problems with in-house production, less
capital investment and more ﬂexibility with out-
sourcing (Brown and Rice, 1998, p. 3). Whether this
decision is out-sourcing or in-house production,
another important issue is the venue of the
production. Now the major trade-off is between
the responsiveness and cost efﬁciency. Many appa-
rel producers choose lower-cost off-shore produc-
tion in Asia and Latin America. The percentage of
imports in units exceeds 70% in all major product
categories (US Census Bureau, 2005b, Table 5).
Paugal also uses off-shore contractors for manu-
facturing its apparel. When the collection of orders
is complete, cumulative orders in each style is
assigned to one of four contractors in China and
Bangladesh. The assignment is usually based on the
production volume of each style. For all of these
factories, the production and transportation lead
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delivered to retailers at the end of July.
Kurt Salmon Associates reports that some
companies are pursuing blended sourcing strategies
(Apparel Industry Magazine, 1997). Domestic
production is used for fashion items, while basic
products are produced in off-shore facilities. The
report also includes an example of an apparel
manufacturer that uses three contractors for
the very same product: a low-cost high lead-time
(90 days) Far East contractor, a medium-cost
medium lead-time (21 days) Latin American con-
tractor and a high-cost low lead-time (3–5 days)
domestic contractor. Another example is Grifﬁn
Manufacturing, which survived the initial loss of
work to overseas by successfully aligning its strategy
to offer a combination of low-cost overseas and
fast-response local manufacturing to its customers
(Stratton and Warburton, 2003).
The new designs are used to make patterns by
which the fabric is cut. An efﬁcient layout of the
patterns on fabric is crucial in reducing the wasted
material. CAD systems may be used for pattern
layout and be further integrated to computer-aided
cutting systems (Abernathy et al., 1995). The later
stages of apparel manufacturing are quite labor
intensive as they are not appropriate for any kind
of automation. Whether it is in a large or
small manufacturing facility, garment is usually
assembled using the progressive bundle system
(PBS). In PBS, or batch production with its general
name, the work is delivered to individual work-
stations from the cutting room in bundles. Sewing
machine operators then systematically process them
in batches. The supervisors direct and balance the
line activities and check quality. The result of such a
system is of course large work-in-process inven-
tories and minimal ﬂexibility (Taplin, 1997). In
order to move the apparel faster through the
successive sewing operations, some apparel produ-
cers began to use unit production systems, which
reduce the buffer sizes between the operations.
Another way is to use modular assembly systems,
which allow a small group of sewing operators to
assemble the entire garment (Abernathy et al., 1995;
Blackburn, 1991).
2.1.4. Distribution
Assembled garments are labeled, packaged and
usually shipped to a warehouse. The garments are
then shipped to the retailers’ warehouses. In an
effort to compress the time from placement of theretailer’s order to the consumer’s purchase of the
apparel, several practices are gaining popularity.
First, there is increased automation and use of
electronic processing in the warehouses of both
manufacturers and retailers. Manufacturers are
assuming responsibility in many functions, once
considered to be part of retailers’ services. Among
them are labeling products with the retailer’s price
tags, preparing them on hangers and shipping them
directly to stores.
2.2. Retail operations
A retailing organization is responsible for the
following tasks: buying merchandise for sale in stores
 operating stores for the selling of merchandise
 operating warehouses and trucks for receiving,
storage and trans-shipment of merchandise
in addition to the usual tasks such as ﬁnance,
marketing and personnel management. Most large
retailers are organized in a way that these three
tasks are separated: a general merchandise manager
responsible for buying, a manager of stores respon-
sible for store operations and an operations
manager responsible for logistics (Bell, 1994). It
should be noted that a close contact between the
buying and sales organizations is required to better
understand the point of view of the customers and
merchandise assortments accordingly.
2.2.1. Fashion buying and replenishment
Mass merchandisers, department stores and
specialty stores are the major outlets for apparel.
Merchandising practices vary depending on the type
of outlet and the fashion content of the apparel.
Large organizations manifest different levels of
centralization in their buying organizations. Com-
petitive deals with the vendors are possible with
consolidated buying. However, a decentralized
buying better addresses the different tastes and
different size needs of the customers in different
geographic areas. Nordstrom, for example, used
this strategy to expand its operations in the 1970s
(Parpia, 1995; Spector and McCarthy, 1995). How-
ever, Nordstrom is now using a hybrid system where
it employs decentralized buying for some items and
centralized buying for others (Women’s Wear Daily,
2006). Federated Department Stores, on the other
hand, had adopted a centralized buying approach in
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scale in purchasing even further through its
acquisition of May Department Stores in 2005
(DSN Retailing Today, 2005). After 100 years of
decentralized buying, J.C. Penney also shifted to
centralized buying, which proved to be a ﬁnancial
success by signiﬁcantly reducing the number of
items carried (Discount Store News, 2003; Women’s
Wear Daily, 2005).
At LDS, about 10 buyers cover women’s wear for
the Western US. Each buyer is responsible for a
separate category of apparel items and all merchan-
dise under a buyer’s responsibility would potentially
generate similar proﬁt margins. This system ensures
that the buyers would not only buy those items that
are believed to generate more margins as most of
their compensation is determined by the total
margin of their purchases. Successful buyers are
generally among the highest paid employees of the
chain, rivaling executives and store managers. The
buyers have tremendous power in representing the
chain to the vendors and are responsible for a large
portion of the chain’s proﬁt. Since the buyer’s
performance evaluation criterion (and his or her
bonus) is the total proﬁtability (total margins) of the
apparel lines he or she buys (which depends on the
purchase cost, the initial selling price, the subse-
quent mark-downs and the units sold under each
price point), it is in the buyer’s interest to ensure
that she buys the right items generating the best
ﬁnancial results for the chain as a whole.
Merchandising activities start as early as the end
of a comparable season in the previous year. At
LDS, for example, buying decisions are made
usually 6–9 months before the start of each selling
season. The planning process at J.C. Penney starts
with the estimation of individual store sales for the
next year (Blasberg et al., 1996). Initial wholesale
purchase quantities are then established by buyers.
Fashion direction for the season is developed based
on a variety of sources including the past records of
the organization, competition, market research,
fashion and trade shows and magazines (Bohdano-
wicz and Clamp, 1994, p. 95). About 9 months
before the start of the season, buyers shop at major
markets and start developing their merchandise
plan. Five months before the season, buyers visit the
markets and make their preliminary orders with the
vendors. The contact with the vendors often takes
place at trade shows. Prior personal contacts and
recommendations also play an important role. Most
larger retailers have strategic alliances with theirvendors and buy a huge variety of products in large
quantities (Chain Store Age, 1996). Some buyers
(e.g., a Macy’s buyer) are only responsible for
buying merchandise from one vendor (e.g., Liz
Claiborne).
The buyer’s decisions are controlled by a budget
set by the merchandise managers (or an adminis-
trator as it is called at LDS). A buyer’s budget is
usually updated each season based on his/her
performance and consumer trends in the apparel
line he/she is buying. The maximum amount of
funds the buyer can allocate for new purchases is
often called open-to-buy (OTB). OTB is calculated
using the following formula:
OTB ¼ budgeted closing stockþ budgeted sales
þ budgeted reductions ðmark-downs; theftsÞ
 opening inventory purchases already received
 purchase orders placed but not yet received
The budgeted components of OTB are derived
before the start of the season from the corporate
merchandising budget (ﬁrst, demand forecasts are
used to determine budgeted sales, which is then used
to calculate the budgeted closing stock level, which
will maintain a speciﬁc inventory to sales ratio).
During the season, the opening inventory is updated
by the ﬂow of merchandise that occurred since the
start of the season. This updates the OTB ﬁgure,
which drives the new purchases, sales or reductions
(Goodwin, 1992). The purpose of the system is to
control the sales in order to keep the inventory in
budgeted levels. Such a system has two potential
problems. First, the calculation of OTB (which in
effect determines the purchase quantities) uses only
the point estimate of demand (i.e., budgeted sales),
ignoring the uncertain nature of the apparel
industry. Second, most retailers do not update their
budgeted sales (thus budgeted closing stocks) during
the season. Therefore, especially when the pre-
season forecast is conservative, the service level
deteriorates since new orders are placed only if OTB
becomes available. With an empirical study, Good-
win (1992) veriﬁes that the OTB system constrains
the performance of buyers and suggests that it
should incorporate the updates in demand forecasts.
Goodwin also suggests that mark-downs should
be based on sales activity rather than budgeted prior
to season.
At the start of the season, some buyers choose to
spend all of their OTBs. Some others choose to hold
back some of their OTBs for opportunistic buys
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colors and fabrics of the current season. Initial
orders constitute anywhere between 60% and 100%
of the total order in a given product category
(Subrahmanyan, 2000). For example, suit buyers
spend 80% up-front and keep the remaining 20%
for on-season buys (Daily News Record, 1993).
Filene’s Basement buys 60% of its merchandise
before the season (Chain Store Age, 2006). A
traditional practice is to receive all bought mer-
chandise before the season. However, recently, more
and more retailers are using different windows of
delivery through the season. This helps to maintain
a fresh look of the store over the entire season. Suit
retailers, for example, typically use two or three
delivery windows (Daily News Record, 1993).
For J.C. Penney, preliminary orders constitute
50–75% of the anticipated total orders. The
selections are reviewed by the stores and the
merchandise commitment is ﬁnalized after collect-
ing individual store orders 2.5 months prior to the
season. The above merchandising cycle is typical for
nationally branded apparel. For companies that are
marketing their own private labels, the merchandis-
ing activities are more complicated and may involve
the coordination of manufacturing activities such as
design and fabric sourcing. For such companies,
buyers and merchandise managers have to work
closely with brand managers responsible for the
private-label apparel, in order to maintain a proﬁt-
able mix of branded–private-label merchandise in
their assortments.
Throughout a selling season, merchandise display
on the store ﬂoor is periodically updated, with two
or three apparel groups marked as new arrivals at
one time. There can be 8–10 apparel groups in total
within a selling season. Arrangements are made,
especially with domestic suppliers, to have the
merchandise delivered to the stores (or the retail
chain’s distribution center) monthly. Such a stag-
gered schedule has two major effects: (1) smoothing
out production for the vendors and (2) keeping the
retail store constantly refreshed in merchandise
display with new items. This is done to capture
shoppers’ attention who are usually attracted to
newly arrived items being put on prominent display;
a shopper who sees the same few items on display
would assume that the store has nothing new to
offer and would therefore quickly lose interest in
the store.
While this merchandising cycle is repeated for
each season for fashion apparel, basic items aresubject to longer life cycles and are mostly on
automatic replenishment plans. Electronic data
interchange (EDI) systems enabling these plans are
gaining popularity as the vendors are compressing
their cycle times by Quick Response systems. These
plans are usually based on strategic alliances and are
taking over the responsibilities of buyers. One such
alliance is between J.C. Penney and TAL Apparel
Group, which reduced the cycle times from 6
months to 30 days and reduced J.C. Penney’s
inventory levels from 6-month supply to 7-week
supply (Apparel Magazine, 2006).
Ideally, past sales data should be a major factor
in buying and re-ordering decisions. Recent ad-
vances make enormous amounts of point-of-sales
(POS) data available to buyers. However, this is not
quite the fact, as the CEO of Federated’s Logistics
and Operations division states, ‘‘Where we have
made little progress,y, is in changing the way
our buyers go to market and buy. I don’t see them
using this data nearly as much as I expected.’’ In
some departments, buyers are far away from
efﬁcient use of sales data in their merchandise
selections, ending up with inventory turns less than
once per year. The result is a huge number of SKUs,
most of them moving fairly slowly. Macy’s Herald
Square store carries 5.5 million SKUs (Apparel
Industry Magazine, 1998). Even if the product in
consideration is a brand new item to be offered in
an upcoming season, the past record of similar
products can be used to improve its buying and
pricing decisions. Motivated by a number of
companies in Asia, Choi (2007) shows that the
market information of a related pre-seasonal
product may be effectively used to update the
demand forecast of a seasonal product at the
succeeding stages and this may lead to considerable
increase in the proﬁts of fashion retailers. Quite
recently, major retailers started improving their
forecasting and fulﬁllment through the use of
massive software solutions. Dillard’s, for example,
started using i2 Technology’s Demand Planner
and Replenishment Planner solutions to create
replenishment orders for 2.9 million SKUs every
week. Dillard’s inventory turnover rate was 3.7,
while the industry average was 4.9 in 1998 before
implementing i2’s solution. Dillard’s was able to
increase its inventory turnover rate to 5.2, slightly
above the industry average, through the use of the
solution and is planning to roll it off to 15 million
SKUs that it is currently merchandizing (Baseline,
2003).
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responsible for many stores in a particular sales
region. When a buyer decides on what to buy and
how much to buy, the buyer is deciding for all the
stores in aggregate. A ‘‘planner’’ works closely with
the buyer to distribute the assortment and purchas-
ing quantities across different stores, accounting for
differences in store locations such as area income
level or demography. The ‘‘allocations’’ across
stores are generally not even; a store may not
‘‘get’’ any allocation of a particular item at all.
When a vendor delivers a batch of garments, the
shipment can go to a central warehouse or
distribution center ﬁrst and then be broken down
and re-shipped to individual stores. Alternatively,
the shipment can go directly to individual stores
without ever entering a central warehouse or
distribution center (this is called drop-ship); in this
mode, the vendor’s garments must be ‘‘ﬂoor ready’’
(complete with the proper labels and price tags and
hangers).
A buyer sometimes moves an item from one store
to another store; when this occurs, a direct trans-
shipment between the two stores may not always
occur. At LDS, a transfer between two stores has to
go to a distribution center, for it was found that the
potential costs of miscounts and mishandling of
goods in direct trans-shipment between two stores
can offset the additional transportation cost of
moving merchandise through the DC.
2.2.2. Pricing
Apparel retailers usually employ cost-based pri-
cing techniques for the initial prices for their
merchandise. Typically, the initial price is the cost
of the product plus a percentage mark-on. This
mark-on percentage is such that the revenue
obtained from the sales will be adequate to cover
all expenses incurred in the business plus a reason-
able proﬁt. Rather than detailed item-speciﬁc
pricing based on expected sales activity, most
retailers choose to follow company-speciﬁc simple
rules, or other retailers in the same category (i.e.,
department store, discount store and specialty store)
offering similar merchandise. At LDS, the buyer
sets the initial price, but more or less based on a
company-wide price schedule. Corporate manage-
ment uses pricing guides and schedules to achieve
control and uniformity of items bought by different
buyers. Small stores sometimes multiply their cost
by 2 or 2.2 as a general rule in setting prices. Mark-
on percentages may also depend on the volume ofthe sales. As an example, custom printed and
embroidered sporting merchandise are called to
mark-on 100–150% for quantities of under two
dozen pieces and 80–100% for quantities two to six
dozen (Sporting Goods Business, 1998). Also, as a
general rule, fashion items with higher risks and
items with small volume command higher mark-ons
(Bohdanowicz and Clamp, 1994, p. 110). Some
retailers (usually discounters) try to group different
styles around different prices and charge the same
price for the styles in the same group (price lining).
Some retailers such as One Price Clothing Stores
(Discount Merchandiser, 1997) went as far as
charging a single price for all of its merchandise
(singular pricing). Overall, initial pricing is a part of
retailer’s marketing strategy rather than micro-
managed at the product level. In fact, retailers in
the same category tend to follow similar pricing
strategies (in the case of discount stores, price alone
is the reason for categorization). Department stores
have been known to charge high initial prices and
offer deep mark-downs later in the season. This is
contrary to apparel specialty stores, offering med-
ium prices throughout the season. According to
W.J. Salmon, professor of retailing at the Harvard
Business School, pricing policies of department
stores that he refers to as ‘‘usurious prices followed
by illegitimate sales’’ are one of the major reasons
for department stores’ declining performance in the
early 1990s (Discount Merchandiser, 1994). Realiz-
ing this, Dillard’s Department Stores began to
practice every day low pricing or every day fair
pricing (EDLP/EDFP) (Chain Store Age, 1994).
Most retailers change the prices of their merchan-
dise during the season usually by offering discounts.
Several factors distinguish the apparel industry
from other industries in pricing decisions. First,
the value of fashion merchandise deteriorates at an
enormous speed. Left-over merchandise would have
little or no value at the end of the season. Second,
there is a considerable amount of uncertainty
involved in consumer taste, and hence in demand
for a particular fashion merchandise. Part or all of
this uncertainty can be resolved as the retailer starts
to observe the sales after the start of season. Finally,
retail space is highly competitive in the fashion
industry. Ideally, a retailer should consider all of
these factors in its sales decisions, maximizing its
revenues over the entire season, preferably selling all
inventories by the end of the season to allocate the
entire retail space for fresh merchandise of the new
season.
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sales, within-season promotional sales and end-of-
season clearance sales (Pashigian, 1995). In some
merchandise categories, retailers charge introduc-
tory low prices for a short period of time before the
start of the season. For example, at LDS, the pre-
season sale for the winter season is held in late
August, and each garment is marked 25% of regular
price, or comes with two price tags: one with the
regular in-season price and another with a 25%
marked down price with a purchase date limitation.
The resulting increased store trafﬁc allows the
retailer to gather information about the popular
colors, styles and garments early enough for
appropriate replenishments within season. Within-
season promotional sales, on the other hand, use
discounts on particular merchandise to increase
store trafﬁc for improving sales not only on
discounted items but also on other slow-moving
items. These temporary POS discounts are usually
applied at the cash register, and price tags are not
physically changed to reﬂect the temporary price.
The most common form of sales is end-of-season
clearance sales aimed to liquidate all stocks before
the end of the season. Clearance sales are compara-
tively more tactical in nature and should be based
on detailed analysis of individual item’s sales
activity. The timing and depth of these mark-downs
are crucial decisions as early and deep mark-downs
may result in revenue losses, and late and not
sufﬁciently deep mark-downs may result in obsolete
inventories at the end of the season. Factors such as
customers substituting regular priced items by
marked down items (cannibalization) should also
be considered. Despite the importance of this
difﬁcult problem, mark-down decisions in practice
do not follow any scientiﬁc rule. This is again in
spite of the fact that required POS data are easily
available to decision makers. Mark-downs are
usually subject to the buyer’s budget, limiting the
responsiveness of these decisions to sales activity
(Chain Store Age, 1999; Goodwin, 1992; Women’s
Wear Daily, 1999). For some companies, mark-
downs are completely sales driven and automated.
At Filene’s Basement Store, all merchandise not
sold within 2 weeks is marked down by 25%; the
remaining merchandise after 4 weeks is marked
down by an additional 25% and the remaining
merchandise after 6 weeks is marked down by
another 25% (The Boston Globe, 2006). While this
policy is easy to implement, it is questionable that it
gives the maximum proﬁt across all merchandisecategories. A more rigorous analysis should include
a probabilistic treatment of demand and allow
dynamic pricing based on remaining inventory and
time before the end of the season.
At LDS, there are company-wide guidelines as to
when and how much to mark-down. There are a few
pre-set mark-down levels: 25%, 30%, 50% and
60%. The ﬁrst mark-down occurs in approximately
the sixth week. Once an item is marked down, its
shelf space is consolidated (for example from two
shelves to one shelf) or it is moved to a less
prominent display area. For ‘‘hard’’ mark-downs
like 50% or 60% off, the garments are moved to
special racks organized by garment size so that a
shopper can go directly to the right rack to ﬁnd all
styles of her size. Since two new groups arrive every
2 weeks throughout the same season, the stores can
constantly refresh their display and inventory.
Almost never will the stores mark the price up, no
matter how hot an item is selling. We can conjecture
that if the retailers had practiced mark-ups during
the season, the initial prices would not be this high,
a problem well known in department stores. The
‘‘no-mark-up’’ rule applies also to vendors. If a
vendor has a ‘‘hit’’ item and the buyer screams for
more of it, the vendor will usually charge the same
price, but may bundle the item with some less
popular items or attach some other sales conditions.
While mark-downs are quite frequent, store-wide
sales are relatively infrequent as it is feared that
consumers may act strategic and ‘‘wait for the
sales’’. Store-wide sales are twice a year at LDS, one
of them after Christmas. At those events, the whole
store space is organized for the sales (whereas for
smaller sales, the items marked down are put in
special corners or back space). Sales also tend to
occur before annual or semi-annual inventory
counts, so that the store personnel have fewer items
to count.
Recently, the fashion industry has seen some
efforts to implement analytical methods for mark-
down decisions. Several software companies intro-
duced price optimization or mark-down optimiza-
tion solutions for the retail industry and applied
successfully to apparel retailers. Examples include
ProﬁtLogic, whose customers included J.C. Penney,
Casual Male, Old Navy, Marshall Fields and
Bloomingdale’s (Stores, 2003; Bobbin, 2002b;
Girard, 2003) and Spotlight Solutions, whose
customers included ShopKo, Saks Inc. and Dillard’s
(Stores, 2002; The New York Times, 2002a).
In 2003, Spotlight Solutions were acquired by
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Oracle in 2005.
Other niche software companies in the RRM
market include KhiMetrics (acquired by SAP in
2006), DemandTec and 4R Systems (Stores, 2003).
Major SCM software vendors such as i2 and
Manugistics are also offering pricing optimization
tools emphasizing the importance of integration
(CRMDaily.com, 2002). While mark-down optimi-
zation is the most mature segment of the RRM
market (Girard, 2003), these software companies
are also offering solutions for initial price optimiza-
tion and promotion optimization (Achabal, 2003).
Despite the reported success of software solutions
on price optimization (Girard, 2003; Stores, 2002),
adaptation of price-optimization tools in retail has
been slow. According to AMR Research, only
5–6% of retailers and no more than 100 chains are
using use price-optimization technology (Informa-
tionWeek, 2005; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 2006).
However, the market for price optimization in retail
is expected to grow and many software vendors
(including big players such as SAP and Oracle with
their recent acquisitions of KhiMetrics and Proﬁt-
Logic, respectively) are trying to grab a share.
According to a report by Yankee Group, retailers
are expected to spend $218 million for these
solutions in 2007 (InformationWeek, 2005).
3. Trends in apparel manufacture and retail
3.1. Retail consolidation, vertical integration and
emergence of private labels
3.1.1. Labels
The retailing space per capita increased from
8 square feet to 19 square feet in the last 20 years,
reﬂecting the increased demand created by baby
boomers. However, aging of the same population,
changing consumer priorities and introduction of
non-traditional retailing outlets decreased the con-
sumer interest in many sub-sectors of the US
retailing industry. The over-stored US retailing
industry in general has faced a considerable number
of bankruptcies and acquisitions in the recent years.
As a result, the total US retail sales are concentrated
in a few major retail companies. The top three
retailers, Wal-Mart, Home Depot and Kroger,
account for $457 billion annual sales in 2005, about
12.3% of all sales in the industry, while the top 100
retailers account for 38.9% (US Census Bureau,
2005a; Stores, 2006). The scene is not very differentfor fashion retailing. The apparel sales are far away
from sustaining a productive use of retail space as a
result of consumers’ preference for comfort over
fashion and a casual work place. As a result,
apparel and accessory stores have experienced very
high failure rates, the highest among all retail sub-
sectors (Standard Poor’s, 1998). Between 1999 and
2004, the number of ﬁrms in men’s clothing retailing
and women’s clothing retailing went down to 5098
and 13,015, respectively, from 5902 and 15,977, two
of the sharpest declines in the retailing sector in the
US. During the same period, the number of
department stores, a major channel for apparel
sales, declined to 100 from 141 (US Census Bureau,
1999b, 2004a). The domestic apparel market is
dominated by 12 major retail groups, representing
almost two-thirds of the sales (US Department of
Commerce, 1999).
Retail consolidation shifted the industry power
from apparel manufacturers to large and powerful
retailers. Fewer and stronger retail ﬁrms are in a
position to mandate favorable terms in their
contracts with manufacturers involving price, ser-
vice, delivery, and product diversiﬁcation and
differentiation (US International Trade Commis-
sion, 1995). Mass retailers are willing to order closer
to the actual sales and shrink their inventories by
continuous supplier replenishment throughout their
selling seasons. The result is higher inventory risk
assumed by manufacturers. Several services once
considered to be part of retailer operations, such as
pre-ticketing the retailer’s price tags and storing the
apparel on hangers, are now part of manufacturers’
operations (US International Trade Commission,
1998). The ﬁnancial penalties in case of errors and
failure to meet vendor compliance standards further
increase the costs of manufacturers. As an example
of these standards, since 1994, Sears expects all of
its vendors to use EDI and bar code shipping labels,
and ship merchandise as close to ﬂoor ready as
possible meeting the company’s Floor Ready
Product standards (Apparel Industry Magazine,
1998). These and other requirements are difﬁcult
to satisfy for small and medium-sized companies.
Paugal also struggled with the restructuring and
increased import penetration in the apparel indus-
try. The company’s production volume decreased
substantially. Pierre Levy, the chairman of the
company, explains that the retailers now are the
price setters in the industry. Before even arranging
an appointment with a large retailer, Paugal has to
show the proof of its ﬁnancial stability, its costs and
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information he would never reveal 10 years ago.
Using this crucial information, some retailers now
began to remove the intermediaries between them
and the contractors. Mr. Levy explains that a major
retailer initiated a direct business with a factory he
put a lot of effort to ﬁnd in Mexico, after a year of
business with Paugal. Increased pressures to de-
crease costs force Paugal to use contractors in
China, Bangladesh and Mexico. Moreover, the
company has to focus on sweaters, where a great
deal of expertise is required for production and
dresses for large-size women where the consumers
are still price insensitive.
Consolidation also helped the retailers to reach the
economies of scale for participating in manufacturing
activities. Mass merchandisers, department stores,
specialty retailers and up-scale retailers are now
offering private labels with competitive prices. For
example, Sears sells casual apparel under its private
label, Canyon Rivers Blues, as well as national
branded apparel such as Levi’s and Wrangler.
Besides cost reductions through the elimination of
intermediaries, retailers with manufacturing opera-
tions are able to respond quicker to changes in
consumer demand and have a better control on the
quality of products that they sell. Uniqueness of
private-label apparel also helped to attract consu-
mers who have been complaining about the sameness
of the merchandise in different retail outlets.
Retailers can also exploit their closeness to the
consumers in the design and marketing of their
private labels. Private labels especially helped depart-
ment stores to regain the market share they lost over
the past several years. Most of the retailers with
private labels are likely to source their private-label
apparel overseas, eliminating the need for US agents
to develop marketing expertise in foreign markets
and to improve their responsiveness to consumer
demands. Imports of private-label apparel accounted
for 15% of the US apparel market in 1997 (US
International Trade Commission, 1998). The retailers
continue to invest in private labels. J.C. Penney
already has 40% of its sales on private labels such
as Arizona, Stafford and Bisou Bisou (while its
competitors average 20%) and is still expanding
its private-label offerings with new brands such as
American Living (Financial Times, 2007). Analysts
identify private-label development as a major means
to improve proﬁtability and expect that increases in
private label will lead to further consolidation in
retail (Apparel Magazine, 2003).The industry also experiences a forward vertical
integration of large manufacturers. In an effort to
increase efﬁciency, eliminate intermediary and
better understand the consumer needs, an increasing
number of textile mills and apparel ﬁrms is involved
in retailing. Some of these companies only operate
factory outlets where they dispose their excess or
second-quality merchandise without damaging their
brand image with merchandise sold in the off-price
retailers.
3.2. Import penetration and production sharing
Limited capital requirements and labor intensity
of the apparel and other textile products manufac-
turing have made the industry a primary industry in
low-waged underdeveloped and developing coun-
tries starting as early as the 1960s. Changes in trade
regulations and advances in transportation and
communication helped to increase the global trade
in apparel. As a result, an increasing portion of
apparel production is moving to less developed
countries and apparel industries in developed
countries are experiencing increasing import pene-
tration in almost all apparel categories. The trend is
similar and a substantial amount of restructuring is
taking place in almost all developed countries
including the UK (Bruce and Daly, 2004), the rest
of the Europe (Keenan et al., 2004) and Japan
(Taplin and Winterton, 1997).
The US apparel industry was not immune to such
globalization. Apparel imports reached $71.6 billion
in 2006, up from $27.7 billion in 1991. The imported
apparel now constitutes more than half of the $100
billion industry (US Department of Commerce,
1999; US Ofﬁce of Textiles and Apparel, 2006).
With reduced trade regulation under preferential
trade agreements (such as North American Free
Trade Agreement and Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act) and the elimination of quotas as
required under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, we now see the same increasing trend in
all apparel categories. Traditional suppliers of
imported material to the US: Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Korea, are losing their market share in the US
market since the beginning of the 1990s, as the
companies are seeking even lower-cost production
in countries such as China, India and Bangladesh.
For example, in a single year after the elimination of
quotas, US imports from China rose by 69.6%,
reaching $15 billion. In order to moderate the
soaring imports from China, the US government
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categories in 2006. These safeguards will be in force
until 2008.
A relatively new trend is production sharing in
the Central and South American countries. Chapter
98 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the US
(formerly item 807 of the tariff schedule) permits cut
fabric to be shipped to low-waged countries and
returned to the US with duty applied only to the
value-added part of the production. Imports under
production sharing account for $12.5 billion in 2005
or 18.2% of all apparel imports in 2005, up from
9% in 1990. Under the NAFTA agreement, there
are no duties for apparel cut in the US and
assembled in Mexico. This and proximity to the
US markets further advantaged Mexico (7.4% of all
imports), making it the second largest supplier of
US imports following China (25.8% of all imports)
(US Ofﬁce of Textiles and Apparel, 2006). However,
since 2000, US imports from Mexico are declining
steadily, reﬂecting the increased competition from
Asia and the countries in the Caribbean Basin.
Generally, US apparel imports concentrate on
basic styles and fabrics for which design changes
are minimal from one season to the other. The
market share of imported apparel is especially high
for all men’s and boy’s clothing, knit-wear, and
women’s coats and jackets (US Census Bureau,
1999a).
US apparel imports under Chapter 98 of HTSUS
from Central and South American countries are
concentrated in fewer products, with high but
unskilled labor content. The major apparel cate-
gories that are manufactured through production
sharing operations include trousers and shorts,
shirts and blouses, foundation garments, under-
wear, and coats and jackets (US International Trade
Commission, 1995). While US manufacturers are
mostly importing from Central and South American
countries through production sharing operations,
US retailers tend to import the full package from
Asian countries since they do not have the expertise
to coordinate manufacturing processes (US Inter-
national Trade Commission, 1998).
Retailers and manufacturers are still restructuring
themselves to increase their foreign sourcing. For
example, V.F. Corporation, producer of Wrangler
and Lee jeans, Vanity Fair intimate apparel,
sourced 50% of its sales globally in 1998 (US
International Trade Commission, 1998). This ratio
increased dramatically to 70% in 2000. Now, V.F.
sources 94% of its apparel from overseas: 56% fromMexico and the Caribbean and 38% from the rest of
the world (Women’s Wear Daily, 2003). Ashworth
Inc., a golf apparel company, sources almost all of
its production off-shore now, a quick shift from
1999, when it was sourcing 100% from the US
(Bobbin, 2003a).
3.3. Quick Response systems
Consolidation, vertical integration and low-cost
imports in the apparel industry began to eliminate
the weaker players in the apparel manufacturing
industry. Although there are no signiﬁcant barriers
to enter and expand in the industry with low capital
requirements and use of contractors, remaining
competitive is becoming extremely difﬁcult. The
failure rate for apparel and other textile manufac-
turing businesses was 136 out of 10,000 in 1997, the
highest rate among all other manufacturing sub-
sectors. A total of 364 businesses that failed in 1997
had about $1 billion liabilities (The Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 1999). The total number of
employees in apparel manufacturing dropped to
316,900 in 2003, down from 892,900 in 1997 (US
Department of Labor, 2003).
In order to compete with foreign manufacturers
that are able to meet the increasing demands of big
and powerful retailers, the industry initiated a series
of technological innovations and business practices
called Quick Response in 1985 (Hammond and
Kelly, 1991). Quick Response intends to tie the
apparel and textile manufacturing and retailing
operations to provide the ﬂexibility to quickly
respond to consumer needs in a volatile industry.
In 1986, Kurt Salmon Associates estimated that the
inefﬁciencies in the supply chain cost the industry
about 24% of net retail apparel sales annually or
$25 billion in the form of forced mark-downs, excess
inventory and stock-outs (Frazier, 1986). As a result
of various process changes that link the retailing
and manufacturing operations, responsiveness can
be used to effectively substitute for fashion sense,
forecasting ability and/or inventory required for
operating under uncertainty (Richardson, 1996).
Ideally, a Quick Response system would enable the
manufacturer to adjust the production of different
styles, colors and sizes in response to retail sales
during the season. The immediate objective is to
reduce the cycle times and be able to produce as
close to the consumers’ needs as possible, decreasing
risks and inventories at each stage of manufacturing
and retailing operations.
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the cycle times in manufacturing and retailing.
CAD/CAM equipment is used to reduce the cycle
time from design to production. POS scanners at the
checkout counters read the bar code attached to
each item and record the merchandise sales by its
price, style, color and size. EDI systems then can be
used to transfer this real-time information to
different stages of the supply chain, facilitating
automatic re-ordering or even allowing the manu-
facturer to manage its retailers’ inventories. A
successful quick-response implementation also de-
pends on substantial information sharing and
coordination between the manufacturer and the
retailer.
In addition to information technologies men-
tioned above, a number of business practices are
required for an ideal Quick Response system. In the
logistics arena, just-in-time shipping policies with
frequent and small lots, pre-ticketing and drop
shipments are necessary. On the manufacturing
side, ﬂexible, short-run and high-speed processing,
automated material handling and modular produc-
tion concepts are commonly practiced by Quick
Response manufacturers (Hunter, 1990).
Abernathy et al. (1995) reports that a Quick
Response retailer should be able meet the following
standards: Track sales in individual styles, colors and sizes
on a store-level and real-time basis. Replenish products at the store quickly.
 Hold minimal excess inventories at the store level
beyond what is on the sales ﬂoor. Provide logistical support for the above practices.
 Create manufacturer performance standards for
replenishable products, specifying standards for
order-to-replenishment lead times, shipment ac-
curacy and delivery information, and setting out
penalties for non-compliance.
These standards will then establish the following
standards for the Quick Response manufacturers: Label units, track sales and respond in real time
to product orders at speciﬁed style, color and size
levels. Exchange electronic information concerning cur-
rent sales and related information with retailers. Provide goods to retailer distribution centers in
ways that allow goods to be moved efﬁciently to
stores for distribution (for example, boxesmarked with computer-scannable symbols con-
cerning contents; shipments of products ready
for display in retail stores).
While these standards are currently met mostly by
increased inventory levels of ﬁnished goods, further
manufacturing responsiveness may be achieved by
establishing or improving the following internal
practices at the manufacturer level: The ability to forecast and plan future produc-
tion needs based on sales data provided by the
retailer. Distribution centers capable of providing logis-
tical support to efﬁciently process shipments to
multiple retailers. Manufacturing practices adapted to producing a
variety of styles, sizes and colors under shorter
lead-time requirements. Agreement with key suppliers to provide shorter
procurement lead times and smaller minimum
orders for textiles and other suppliers to accom-
modate changing demand requirements.
Abernathy et al. (1995) reports that between 1988
and 1992 there is a substantial growth in the number
of retailers requiring suppliers to meet their Quick
Response related standards such as bar coding, EDI
and automated distribution centers. More and more
manufacturers are now changing their internal
practices related to manufacturing and performing
activities such as bar coding, preparing the mer-
chandise for selling and distribution to retail outlets
that are not once considered the responsibilities of
manufacturers. Kurt Salmon Associates notes the
10 years of Quick Response implementation a major
success, saving $13 billion through a combination of
removing excess stocks from the system and
enabling wider and more accurate assortments
(Bobbin, 1997b). Quick Response systems are still
in use as retailers are demanding more responsive-
ness from their manufacturers. Liz Claiborne, for
example, uses two Quick Response programs, Liz
Quick and Liz Chase, to react faster to changes in
consumer demand (Bobbin, 2003a). Signiﬁcant
improvements due to Quick Response initiatives
are observed also for other countries. For example,
Perry et al. (1999) report that a government-
initiated Quick Response program in Australia
resulted in considerable beneﬁts to the program
partners, doubling metrics such as annual sales,
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by the due date.
3.4. Supplier selection: off-shore versus
domestic sourcing
Retailers and manufacturers consider a number
of factors when deciding where to supply their
merchandise. The ﬁrst group of factors includes the
production or purchase costs, inventory storage
costs and transportation costs. These are related to
the efﬁciency of the supply chain. Fisher (1997)
classiﬁes them to be the physical costs of the supply
chain. The other group is related to the responsive-
ness of the supply chain; how accurate and fast
supply is able to match demand. If supply exceeds
demand, the merchandise has to be marked down,
and sold at a price possibly less than the cost. If
supply is less than demand, the company loses sales
opportunities and dissatisﬁes its customers. Fisher
calls resulting costs market mediation costs. For
products that satisfy basic needs, with long life
cycles, and thus stable demand (functional products
as called by Fisher), physical costs should be the
focus. For products with high fashion content,
short life cycles and thus hard-to-predict demand
(innovative products as called by Fisher), compa-
nies should rather try to minimize market mediation
costs.
The apparel market consists of many products
with varying levels of fashion content (innovation or
functionality). Fashion content not only deﬁnes the
season length but also affects where retailers or
manufacturers source their merchandise. Basic
apparel merchandise generally has longer selling
seasons, and physical costs are likely to represent a
major part of potential total costs. Like most labor-
intensive low-technology industries in the US, a
natural choice of production venue for basic
products is developing or underdeveloped countries
where wages are substantially lower. Fashion
products, on the other hand, have generally shorter
life cycles and market mediation costs play a major
role. For fashion products, apparel retailers seek
responsiveness when making their sourcing deci-
sions. A few factors deﬁne responsiveness. First of
all, order lead times play a major role. If the order
lead times are long, apparel retailers need to order
much in advance of the start of the season, when
their knowledge of consumer demand is limited.
Long lead times also prohibit the replenishment
opportunities within the season. According to astudy by Prudential Securities Inc., delivery lead
times for leading branded women’s apparel ﬁrms for
imports from Asia are as high as 35 weeks, as
compared with 35 days for imports from Mexico
and the Caribbean (US International Trade Com-
mission, 1999). According to a survey of US and
UK consumer goods retailers, the average lead time
for orders from Asian and Central American
vendors is as much as 48–60 and 24–36 weeks,
respectively, while the average lead time for orders
from North American vendors is 12–24 weeks
(Lowson, 2001). According to the same study,
61% and 53% of the retailers are able to change
the mix and volume of their orders, respectively, if
they source from North American vendors. Corre-
sponding percentages are only 30% and 14% for
Asian vendors and 48% and 37% for Central
American vendors. North American vendors are
also providing more ﬂexibility over their Asian and
Central American counterparts for excess stocks. In
all, 76% of the retailers say that their North
American vendors agree to returns or discounts
for surplus goods, while corresponding percentages
are only 50% and 27% for Asian and Central
American vendors, respectively. It is clear that it is
primarily domestic manufacturing that can provide
the responsiveness demanded by apparel retailers.
An individual retailer’s choice may be to source its
particular merchandise from overseas or from a
manufacturer in the US, whichever minimizes its
total costs (physical and market mediation). For a
particular merchandise category, these individual
decisions may be aggregated in one statistic: market
share of imports. Table 1 lists the market share of
imports and import/domestic costs for selected
apparel categories in 2005.
In all categories, imports capture more than half
of the market share as imports are providing
signiﬁcant cost beneﬁts. For example, the import
cost for men’s swimwear is approximately 57% less
than the domestic cost, which leads to 99% import
penetration. It should be noted that cost alone is not
the only factor for sourcing decisions for apparel
retailers. Imported men’s suits cost 65.4% less than
the suits manufactured domestically, which leads to
88.8% import penetration. In women’s dresses,
which is a comparable category in women’s apparel,
import cost is 60.8% less than the domestic cost.
However, import penetration in women’s dresses is
only 71.7%. The low market share of imports for
women’s apparel categories reﬂects the importance
of fashion in women’s apparel. Apparel retailers
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Table 1
Market share and cost of imports in apparel in 2005
Market share
of importsa
Average
domestic priceb
Average
import pricec
Men’s
Suits 88.8 165.39 57.23
Swimwear 99.0 10.17 4.41
Women’s
Dresses 71.7 24.55 9.60
Swimwear 81.5 16.47 5.78
Data compiled from the US Census Bureau (2005b).
aDerived by dividing imports for consumption to apparent
consumption in the US market.
bAverage cost ($) per unit for manufacturers’ shipments.
cAverage cost ($) (cost+insurance+freight) per unit from
imports for consumption.
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apparel and domestic sourcing provides the respon-
siveness they need through shorter lead times.
Fig. 1 shows the import and domestic unit prices
for men’s and women’s swimwear over the years
1991–2005. For both categories, imports have a
substantial cost advantage over domestic produc-
tion. In both categories, domestic prices ﬁrst
increased gradually between 1991 and 1997, after
which a decline is observed. Imports, on the other
hand, maintain a steady average price. Fig. 2 shows
the domestic production, imports and domestic
market for men’s and women’s swimwear over the
years 1991–2005 (the domestic market is derived by
subtracting exports from the sum of domestic
production and imports. Domestic data for men’s
swimwear for years 1999, 2000 and 2001 and for
women’s swimwear for year 2001 is interpolated in
the graphs, as it is not disclosed by the Census
Bureau). The market share of domestic production
in men’s swimwear has virtually disappeared. While
the expanding market in women’s swimwear is
exploited predominantly by imports, domestic
manufacturers were able to maintain their produc-
tion volume, until recently, in spite of considerably
higher prices (US Census Bureau, 1991–2005).
An individual company’s sourcing decision is a
result of the performance measure it uses in
evaluating different supplier alternatives. A tradi-
tional measure has been the gross margin to sales
ratio, which has put the focus on low-cost imports.
However, this measure totally ignores the costs
associated with holding inventory. Advocates of
Quick Response systems suggest the use of grossmargin return on investment (GMROI) as a per-
formance measure, which is basically the gross
margin to average inventory ratio (Bobbin, 1995).
Frequent replenishments advantage domestic man-
ufacturing over imports in this measure especially
when seasons are long. These two measures only
capture physical costs of the supply chain. Measures
capturing the market mediation costs include service
level: percentage of times a customer ﬁnds his or her
ﬁrst-choice SKU; lost sales: percent of customers
ﬁnding none of their SKU preferences; sell-through:
proportion of a season’s merchandise that sells at
ﬁrst price; and jobbed-off: percentage of units
remaining at the end of the season, which must be
disposed off. A computer simulation model devel-
oped at North Carolina State University concludes
that the Quick Response strategy outperforms off-
shore sourcing strategy in these four measures and
GMROI, but falls short of generating higher gross
margin to sales ratio in all the scenarios created
(Bobbin, 1997a). The same results are also reported
in Hunter et al. (1996).
3.5. Electronic commerce
With the emergence of the internet and the
advancement of information technologies, many
companies in the apparel supply chain began to
conduct their business online. Electronic commerce
is divided into two categories. Exchange of in-
formation, services and goods from business to
consumer is called business-to-consumer (B2C) and
from one business to another is called business-to-
business (B2B).
At the B2C front, online sales of apparel started
in the mid 1990s. In 1995, Eddie Bauer and Lands’
End became the ﬁrst major ﬁrms that started
internet operations (Gertner and Stillman, 2001).
Apparel has been one of the favorite types of
products sold over the internet. According to a
research done by Jupiter Research, clothing and
clothing accessories (including footwear) is the lead-
ing category of items purchased online (a projected
total of $10.2 billion online sales in 2006) by the US
consumers after personal computers (US Census
Bureau, 2007).
Online apparel sales are mostly dominated by
retailers that initially have bricks-and-mortar op-
erations. Early pure players (those only have
internet operations) had difﬁculty in competing
with online operations of established brands in
apparel (DSN Retailing Today, 2000; Chain Store
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Data compiled from U.S.Census Bureau (1991–2005)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average Domestic and Import Prices for Women’s Swimwear
Average Domestic and Import Prices for men’s Swimwear
Domestic Price
Import Price
Domestic Price
Import Price
Fig. 1. Average domestic and import prices for men’s and women’s swimwear (1991–2005).
A. S- en / Int. J. Production Economics 114 (2008) 571–593 587Age, 2002b). Electronic commerce pioneer Ama-
zon.com has started its online apparel sales only at
the end of 2002 and had to partner with other
retailers such as Nordstrom and Old Navy (Chain
Store Age, 2002b). Dominance of established
bricks-and-mortar companies in online apparel sales
shows the importance of multi-channel retailing,
i.e., integrating three channels: bricks-and-mortar
stores, websites and catalogs. Multi-channel retai-
lers use their websites to increase the number of
trips to their stores and vice versa. According to a
survey, 22 of the 23 major retailers achieved higher
store trafﬁc among shoppers who also visited the
company’s retail website (Stores, 2001a). Multi-
channel retailers further advantaged themselvesover pure players by leveraging from their bricks-
and-mortar stores for fulﬁllment and reverse logis-
tics. According to a study by Forrester Research,
out of 63 multi-channel retailers, 52 accept in-store
returns of items purchased online and 13 allow store
pickup of online orders. Companies like Gap are
using their online stores exclusively to sell slow-
moving items and to test new products (The Wall
Street Journal, 2003).
While multi-channel retailing is vital for success
in fashion retailing, many companies are ﬁnding it
difﬁcult to integrate multiple channels and offer
consistency in pricing, quality and customer experi-
ence across different channels (Chain Store Age,
2001). Federated Department Stores, for example,
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Data compiled from U.S. Census Bureau (1991–2005)
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Domestic Production, Imports and Domestic Market for Men’s Swimwear
Domestic Production, Imports and Domestic Market for Women’s Swimwear
Domestic production
Imports
Domestic market
Domestic production
Imports
Domestic market
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Fig. 2. Market share of domestic and import men’s and women’s swimwear (1991–2005).
A. S- en / Int. J. Production Economics 114 (2008) 571–593588scaled down its internet business on the blooming-
dales.com and macys.com websites (Bobbin, 2002a).
Some bricks-and-mortar retailers also ﬁnd it difﬁ-
cult to handle fulﬁllment of online orders. Catalog
retailers, such as Lands’ End and L.L. Bean, are
utilizing their experience and existing infrastructure
in order fulﬁllment and have been very proﬁtable in
their internet operations (The Wall Street Journal,
2001). Sears has recently acquired Lands’ End to
leverage its strengths in multi-channel retailing
including excellence in order fulﬁllment. As a result
of the merger, Lands’ End customers are able to
order apparel online or by phone and pick them up
at the local Sears store (Time Magazine, 2002).Despite an enormous potential, online apparel
sales are only a small fraction of total apparel sales.
Online apparel and footwear sales were only 4.3%
of total apparel sales in 2006 (Fig. 3). However,
online sales of apparel are growing signiﬁcantly
each year (online sales were only 2.3% of total sales
in 2002) and are expected to grow even faster,
especially as more women are getting used to shop
online (The New York Times, 2002b).
Like any other industry, the apparel industry was
also greatly inﬂuenced by the B2B marketplaces
starting in the late 1990s. Firms across the apparel
supply chain perform a variety of activities using the
internet including sourcing direct and indirect
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boration, design collaboration, inventory and order
tracking and selling off excess stock (for an over-
view of B2B marketplaces and why they are
efﬁcient, see US Federal Trade Commission, 2000).
B2B exchanges came to existence during the dot-
com boom at the end of the 1990s. According to an
estimate by Kurt Salmon Associates, there were
more than 80 B2B exchanges that focus on the
apparel industry in 2000 (Apparel Industry Maga-
zine, 2000); however, most of these exchanges have
since gone out of business in the early 2000s
(Bobbin, 2002d). Surviving exchanges were those
with powerful retailer members. GlobalNetXchange
(GNX) and WorldWide Retail Exchange (WWRE)
are two such exchanges. These are public exchanges,
i.e., they are independently owned and companies
may participate through a subscription or a mem-
bership process. GNX’s members included Sears,
Federated Department Stores and Carrefour.
WWRE’s members included Target, Kmart, J.C.
Penney and Gap (Bobbin, 2002d). The initial focus
of the public exchanges was auctions and reverse
auctions. GNX conducted 2550 auctions in the ﬁrst
half of 2002 for a transaction volume of $1.6 billion.
Apparel/soft goods transactions accounted for 16%
or $256 million performed by 11 members (out of 35
total members) of the GNX. GNX stated that the
exchange derived savings of $270 million out of a
transaction volume of $2.1 billion (Chain Store Age,
2002a). At the end of 2005, GNX and WWREjoined forces to form Agentrics (Supermarket News,
2005). Private exchanges are usually run by a single
ﬁrm and members are that ﬁrm’s suppliers and
partners. This model of B2B is appropriate for giant
retailers that do not want to share their buying
power with other retailers. An example is Wal-Mart
(Stores, 2001b; InformationWeek, 2000). B2B mar-
ketplaces are also used for liquidating excess
inventory by apparel retailers and manufacturers.
RetailExchange.com, Liquidation.com and clo-
seout.com are among the electronic marketplaces
that allow excess apparel items to be sold through
auctions (DSN Retailing Today, 2001; Retail
Merchandiser, 2002).
In 2000 many analysts were predicting that the
B2B exchanges would dominate the economy in a
short period of time. Jupiter Communications, for
example, was predicting that the total US B2B
market would reach more than $6 trillion in 2005 or
about 60% of the total non-service market (Dem-
beck, 2000). Despite all the heat, the growth in B2B
has been rather slow and the apparel industry was
not an exception. According to a survey by the US
Census Bureau, 21.30% of the wholesale trade in
apparel (NAICS code 4223) was through e-com-
merce in 2004 (‘‘The Census Bureaus e-commerce
measures report the value of goods and services sold
online whether over open networks such as the
Internet, or over proprietary networks running
systems such as Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI).’’). Without EDI, e-commerce constitutes an
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Table 2
2000 and 2004 US wholesale trade in apparel
2000 2004
$ billion % $ billion %
Total 96.501 100.00 108.432 100.00
Total E-commerce 13.103 13.58 23.092 21.30
EDI 11.482 11.90 21.021 19.39
Internet and other 1.621 1.68 2.071 1.91
Source: US Census Bureau (2004b).
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2004 (Table 2). B2B commerce in apparel is
growing, although not with the enormous speed
that was initially predicted.
B2B applications are not only limited to trading
online. Companies are also looking for ways to
collaborate with their supply chain partners over the
internet. For example, i2 Technologies develops
software that allows sharing forecast information
among different members of the apparel supply
chain. V.F. Corporation uses this software for
collaborating with its fabric suppliers. WWRE
(now Agentrics) also used this technology from i2
Technologies to enable its members collaborate over
the exchange (Transportation & Distribution,
2003). Recently emerging PLM applications allow
supply chain partners to collaborate on product
design over the internet. Three companies: Gerber,
Lectra and Freeborders, have developed web-based
PLM applications speciﬁcally for the apparel
industry (Bobbin, 2003b). Liz Claiborne Inc., for
example, uses solutions from FreeBorders to com-
municate designs of 44,000 items to its upstream
suppliers (Bobbin, 2002c). B2B exchanges also
offered PLM solutions to the apparel industry as
part of their services (Bobbin, 2003c).
4. Conclusion
The US apparel industry has been in a transition
over the last 20 years. Imports from lower-wage
countries and retail consolidation forced US man-
ufacturers to look for other ways to remain
competitive: quality and ﬂexibility. Physical proxi-
mity and advances in information and manufactur-
ing technologies enabled US manufacturers to
accept retailer orders closer to the season and
replenish their stocks frequently during the season.
However, retailers continue to source more andmore of their merchandise from overseas with the
cost of having to make risky inventory decisions.
Advances in information technology also made
an enormous amount of point-of-sales data avail-
able to decision makers in retailing. Decision
makers (mostly buyers) are able to learn more
about consumer preferences over styles and colors,
their size distribution and the dynamics of sales.
However, re-quoting the CEO of Federated:
‘‘Where we have made little progress,y, is in
changing the way our buyers go to market and
buy. I don’t see them using this data nearly as much
as I expected’’, this had little effect on their ordering
and pricing decision. These decisions are still
considered as a form of art. While most of retailers
are still foreign to quantitative models, some have
only recently started to explore such models.
Quoting a business consultant working on an
apparel pricing implementation: ‘‘For many of our
merchants, this is the ﬁrst exposure they’ve had to
intelligent systems’’ (Chain Store Age, 1999). The
result of such ignorance is obviously not impressive.
Inventory turnovers in some departments are less
than once a year. While we expect that point-of-
sales data would have the easier impact on ﬁguring
out the size choices of the customer base given the
geographical area, we continue to see only exces-
sively small or large sizes on clearance racks. There
is an apparent and urgent need for practical
quantitative models that effectively use the data
that are already available in the apparel industry.
Several problems are worthy to note for future
research. Dynamic pricing of apparel items has been
recently popular in practice after signiﬁcant success
of revenue management applications in service
industries. Advances in information technology also
helped companies gather the customer demand
information that they will need for analytical
pricing solutions. Dynamic pricing has also received
considerable attention in academia in the last
decade. Three aspects of pricing need further
attention. First, almost all of the models in the
academic literature assume that the customers are
myopic, i.e., their buying decisions are based on
current prices only without considering future
prices. However, we know that consumers of
apparel items are increasingly aware of the pricing
practices of apparel retailers (see, for example, The
Wall Street Journal, 2002) and they may act
strategically and hold back their purchases in
anticipation of declines in prices. The only study
with strategic consumers that we are aware of is
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pre-announced price schedule (which is not very
common in fashion retailing). We are also not aware
of any software solutions that model strategic
consumer behavior. Another important aspect is
the multi-item nature of pricing decisions in the
apparel industry. The price of one apparel item in
an apparel retailer may easily impact the demand
of another apparel item through several factors
including increased store trafﬁc, substitution and
bundling. Moreover, apparel retailers usually
change the prices for a group of items or all items
in the store at the same time. Therefore, dynamic
pricing decisions of different items in a store
should be synchronized. Most academic research
in dynamic pricing ignores the dependencies among
different items. Finally, game theoretical models can
be used to enrich the dynamic pricing solutions. As
the consolidation in the apparel retail leaves a few
number of major retailers in the market, game
theoretical models that model price competition
even at the tactical level will have signiﬁcant impact.
Besides dynamic pricing, a number of other
problems need further attention from academia:
the impact of secondary markets: how replenish-
ment and pricing decisions would vary in the
existence of secondary markets (off-price stores
such as Marshalls and Ross or B2B marketplaces
for excess stock); how and why multi-channel
retailers are advantaging themselves over pure
players (bricks-and-mortar only or internet only
retailers); sourcing decisions for the apparel retail;
and contrasting public and private exchanges for
apparel B2B marketplaces.References
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